Question 70
The ML engineering team reviews source-control practices for shared projects. The immediate design goal is to give an approved source state a human-readable release reference for deployments and audit records. Which approach addresses that goal?
- Pull request review
- Git commit
- Secret scanning response
- Git tag
- Git ignore rules
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:A tag names a particular repository revision. Versioned ML models still need their own artifact identity and lineage.
Incorrect Answers
A:Pull requests expose a proposed diff and provide a review and status-check gate; they do not themselves execute production inference; the outstanding need is to give an approved source state a human-readable release reference for deployments and audit records.
B:A commit associates code changes with an immutable identifier in repository history; it does not snapshot external data or guarantee a successful model deployment; this approach leaves the team unable to give an approved source state a human-readable release reference for deployments and audit records.
C:Credential rotation or revocation addresses exposure that remains in history and clones; deleting the latest copy is not sufficient remediation of a leaked secret; the needed capability is to give an approved source state a human-readable release reference for deployments and audit records.
E:Ignore patterns prevent specified untracked files from being added accidentally; they do not revoke a secret that was previously committed; the team would still need to give an approved source state a human-readable release reference for deployments and audit records.
Question 71
The ML engineering team reviews source-control practices for shared projects. The team is required to keep local credentials, large temporary artifacts, and cache directories out of repository commits. Which option is the best fit?
- Pull request review
- Feature branch
- Git ignore rules
- Secret scanning response
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Ignore patterns prevent specified untracked files from being added accidentally. They do not revoke a secret that was previously committed.
Incorrect Answers
A:Pull requests expose a proposed diff and provide a review and status-check gate; they do not themselves execute production inference; the requirement, by contrast, is to keep local credentials, large temporary artifacts, and cache directories out of repository commits.
B:Branches permit concurrent changes without altering the production baseline; they are a code collaboration mechanism, not a substitute for model version tracking; the team would still need to keep local credentials, large temporary artifacts, and cache directories out of repository commits.
D:Credential rotation or revocation addresses exposure that remains in history and clones; deleting the latest copy is not sufficient remediation of a leaked secret; the implementation under review needs to keep local credentials, large temporary artifacts, and cache directories out of repository commits.
Question 72
The ML engineering team reviews source-control practices for shared projects. An operator is tasked to treat a committed credential as exposed even if its file is later removed from the current branch. Which mechanism provides that capability?
- Git commit
- Secret scanning response
- Git ignore rules
- Git tag
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Credential rotation or revocation addresses exposure that remains in history and clones. Deleting the latest copy is not sufficient remediation of a leaked secret.
Incorrect Answers
A:A commit associates code changes with an immutable identifier in repository history; it does not snapshot external data or guarantee a successful model deployment; the implementation under review needs to treat a committed credential as exposed even if its file is later removed from the current branch.
C:Ignore patterns prevent specified untracked files from being added accidentally; they do not revoke a secret that was previously committed; this alternative does not achieve the requirement to treat a committed credential as exposed even if its file is later removed from the current branch.
D:A tag names a particular repository revision; versioned ML models still need their own artifact identity and lineage; the actual design criterion is to treat a committed credential as exposed even if its file is later removed from the current branch.
Question 73
A GitHub Actions pipeline needs narrow, secretless Azure access for ML deployment. The immediate design goal is to trust tokens only from the intended repository and release branch or environment. Which approach addresses that goal?
- Least-privilege service principal scope
- Protected GitHub environment
- OIDC subject restriction
- Workflow permissions restriction
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:A federated identity credential can match a narrowly specified issuer, audience, and subject. Broad subjects could allow workflows outside the approved release context to obtain access.
Incorrect Answers
A:Azure RBAC should be assigned only at the scope where deployment actions are necessary; federated authentication does not itself determine authorization breadth; the actual design criterion is to trust tokens only from the intended repository and release branch or environment.
B:GitHub environment protections can require designated reviewers before a job proceeds; this approval happens in the pipeline, separate from Azure role evaluation; the outstanding need is to trust tokens only from the intended repository and release branch or environment.
D:Explicit workflow permissions reduce the impact of a compromised step; this governs the GitHub token, not the Azure resource role assigned to the external identity; the needed capability is to trust tokens only from the intended repository and release branch or environment.
Question 74
A GitHub Actions pipeline needs narrow, secretless Azure access for ML deployment. The team is required to authenticate workflow steps to Azure using a trusted OIDC token exchange. Which option is the best fit?
- Workflow permissions restriction
- Azure login with federation
- Least-privilege service principal scope
- Repository secrets hygiene
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Federated Azure login avoids storing a client secret in GitHub. It still depends on correct workload identity configuration and Azure RBAC grants.
Incorrect Answers
A:Explicit workflow permissions reduce the impact of a compromised step; this governs the GitHub token, not the Azure resource role assigned to the external identity; the needed capability is to authenticate workflow steps to Azure using a trusted OIDC token exchange.
C:Azure RBAC should be assigned only at the scope where deployment actions are necessary; federated authentication does not itself determine authorization breadth; the team would still need to authenticate workflow steps to Azure using a trusted OIDC token exchange.
D:Reducing static secrets limits accidental leaks and rotation burden; secret storage is not the preferred substitute for federation when the service supports token-based trust; the specified outcome instead requires the team to authenticate workflow steps to Azure using a trusted OIDC token exchange.
Question 75
A GitHub Actions pipeline needs narrow, secretless Azure access for ML deployment. An operator is tasked to permit the release workflow to update one resource group without granting tenant-wide administration. Which mechanism provides that capability?
- Azure login with federation
- Protected GitHub environment
- Least-privilege service principal scope
- Repository secrets hygiene
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Azure RBAC should be assigned only at the scope where deployment actions are necessary. Federated authentication does not itself determine authorization breadth.
Incorrect Answers
A:Federated Azure login avoids storing a client secret in GitHub; it still depends on correct workload identity configuration and Azure RBAC grants; the specified outcome instead requires the team to permit the release workflow to update one resource group without granting tenant-wide administration.
B:GitHub environment protections can require designated reviewers before a job proceeds; this approval happens in the pipeline, separate from Azure role evaluation; the implementation under review needs to permit the release workflow to update one resource group without granting tenant-wide administration.
D:Reducing static secrets limits accidental leaks and rotation burden; secret storage is not the preferred substitute for federation when the service supports token-based trust; this alternative does not achieve the requirement to permit the release workflow to update one resource group without granting tenant-wide administration.
Question 76
A GitHub Actions pipeline needs narrow, secretless Azure access for ML deployment. The immediate design goal is to require an approval gate before the production deployment job can use environment-scoped configuration. Which approach addresses that goal?
- Protected GitHub environment
- Azure login with federation
- Least-privilege service principal scope
- Workflow permissions restriction
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:GitHub environment protections can require designated reviewers before a job proceeds. This approval happens in the pipeline, separate from Azure role evaluation.
Incorrect Answers
B:Federated Azure login avoids storing a client secret in GitHub; it still depends on correct workload identity configuration and Azure RBAC grants; the actual design criterion is to require an approval gate before the production deployment job can use environment-scoped configuration.
C:Azure RBAC should be assigned only at the scope where deployment actions are necessary; federated authentication does not itself determine authorization breadth; the outstanding need is to require an approval gate before the production deployment job can use environment-scoped configuration.
D:Explicit workflow permissions reduce the impact of a compromised step; this governs the GitHub token, not the Azure resource role assigned to the external identity; this approach leaves the team unable to require an approval gate before the production deployment job can use environment-scoped configuration.
Question 77
A GitHub Actions pipeline needs narrow, secretless Azure access for ML deployment. The team is required to avoid storing long-lived storage keys when managed or federated identity is available. Which option is the best fit?
- OIDC subject restriction
- Repository secrets hygiene
- Least-privilege service principal scope
- Workflow permissions restriction
- Protected GitHub environment
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Reducing static secrets limits accidental leaks and rotation burden. Secret storage is not the preferred substitute for federation when the service supports token-based trust.
Incorrect Answers
A:A federated identity credential can match a narrowly specified issuer, audience, and subject; broad subjects could allow workflows outside the approved release context to obtain access; this approach leaves the team unable to avoid storing long-lived storage keys when managed or federated identity is available.
C:Azure RBAC should be assigned only at the scope where deployment actions are necessary; federated authentication does not itself determine authorization breadth; the requirement, by contrast, is to avoid storing long-lived storage keys when managed or federated identity is available.
D:Explicit workflow permissions reduce the impact of a compromised step; this governs the GitHub token, not the Azure resource role assigned to the external identity; the team would still need to avoid storing long-lived storage keys when managed or federated identity is available.
E:GitHub environment protections can require designated reviewers before a job proceeds; this approval happens in the pipeline, separate from Azure role evaluation; the specified outcome instead requires the team to avoid storing long-lived storage keys when managed or federated identity is available.
Question 78
A GitHub Actions deployment workflow has a correctly restricted OIDC trust relationship but still stores an Azure client secret and requests unnecessary write access from its GitHub token. A protected release environment is already configured. Which TWO changes remove the long-lived Azure secret and minimize the token's repository permissions? Choose TWO.
- Protected GitHub environment
- Workflow permissions restriction
- Repository secrets hygiene
- OIDC subject restriction
- Azure login with federation
Explanation
Correct Answers
B:Explicit workflow permissions reduce the impact of a compromised step; this governs the GitHub token, not the Azure resource role assigned to the external identity. Here, the repository token no longer carries permissions unnecessary to the deployment workflow.
E:Federated Azure login avoids storing a client secret in GitHub; it still depends on correct workload identity configuration and Azure RBAC grants. Here, azure authentication uses the trusted federation rather than a repository-stored credential.
Incorrect Answers
A:GitHub environment protections can require designated reviewers before a job proceeds; this approval happens in the pipeline, separate from Azure role evaluation; the system would still need a remedy for stored Azure credentials and an overprivileged repository workflow token.
C:Reducing static secrets limits accidental leaks and rotation burden; secret storage is not the preferred substitute for federation when the service supports token-based trust; it does not by itself address stored Azure credentials and an overprivileged repository workflow token.
D:A federated identity credential can match a narrowly specified issuer, audience, and subject; broad subjects could allow workflows outside the approved release context to obtain access; the observed fault still involves stored Azure credentials and an overprivileged repository workflow token.
Question 79
The MLOps repository uses GitHub Actions to test code before production promotion. The immediate design goal is to run linting and component tests whenever a proposed change targets the protected branch. Which approach addresses that goal?
- Matrix build
- Artifact upload step
- Reusable workflow
- Pull-request trigger
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:A pull-request event supplies validation before merge. It differs from a release trigger that updates production resources after approval.
Incorrect Answers
A:A workflow matrix expands combinations into test jobs; it helps compatibility validation rather than causing an Azure ML model to scale automatically; the requested task remains to run linting and component tests whenever a proposed change targets the protected branch.
B:Workflow artifacts retain selected files produced during a run; they are distinct from registering a model in Azure ML for inference; this alternative does not achieve the requirement to run linting and component tests whenever a proposed change targets the protected branch.
C:Reusable workflows reduce copy-pasted pipeline YAML and permit shared change management; each caller still supplies appropriate inputs and permissions; the actual design criterion is to run linting and component tests whenever a proposed change targets the protected branch.
Question 80
The MLOps repository uses GitHub Actions to test code before production promotion. The team is required to avoid rebuilding ML infrastructure when a documentation-only change is pushed. Which option is the best fit?
- Pull-request trigger
- Path filter
- Job dependency declaration
- Matrix build
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Workflow path filters scope execution to relevant modified files. They do not establish Azure permissions or validate model quality by themselves.
Incorrect Answers
A:A pull-request event supplies validation before merge; it differs from a release trigger that updates production resources after approval; the outstanding need is to avoid rebuilding ML infrastructure when a documentation-only change is pushed.
C:GitHub Actions job dependencies enforce execution order and success conditions; they do not replace data dependencies inside an Azure ML pipeline; the needed capability is to avoid rebuilding ML infrastructure when a documentation-only change is pushed.
D:A workflow matrix expands combinations into test jobs; it helps compatibility validation rather than causing an Azure ML model to scale automatically; the requirement, by contrast, is to avoid rebuilding ML infrastructure when a documentation-only change is pushed.