Question 270
A formal risk program has implemented controls and needs to ensure exposure remains acceptable as business systems change. Which TWO activities support continuous monitoring? Choose TWO.
- Review emerging threats, control performance, and material environment changes
- Freeze every assessment score permanently after initial approval
- Remove all residual risks from management reporting
- Treat a completed audit as proof that no future threats can emerge
- Report deviations and treatment progress to accountable risk owners
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Risk changes with vulnerabilities, architecture, and attacker behavior, making periodic reassessment necessary.
E:Governance needs evidence that controls work and exceptions or remediation deadlines are handled appropriately.
Incorrect Answers
B:Static scores become outdated when systems, dependencies, and threat conditions change.
C:Unreported exposure cannot be evaluated against business tolerance or revisited by authorized decision makers.
D:An audit represents limited evidence at a point in time and cannot guarantee enduring immunity from new attack paths.
Question 271
A company manages known production servers but wants to discover public IPs, DNS names, and applications an attacker could find outside its network. What capability should it develop?
- Existing firewall rules without a public asset inventory
- An identity access review with no domain or external asset discovery
- External attack surface management (EASM)
- A one-time internal vulnerability scan of known server IPs
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:EASM continuously maps Internet-visible assets and exposed services, including resources missing from internal inventories.
Incorrect Answers
A:Firewall policies constrain known paths but do not reveal all externally accessible services or unexpected resource ownership.
B:Access review helps govern users but cannot enumerate unknown public endpoints or DNS names used by attackers.
D:Internal scanning may identify weaknesses on known systems but can miss untracked Internet-facing resources.
Question 272
An external scan finds a marketing microsite that is not listed in the central asset inventory. What governance problem has likely occurred?
- Automatic confirmation of an insider data breach
- Evidence that all inventory tools are permanently unusable
- Normal certificate key rotation
- Shadow IT or untracked asset deployment
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Resources provisioned outside approved inventory processes create ownership, patching, and monitoring gaps that attackers can exploit.
Incorrect Answers
A:Untracked ownership raises risk but does not alone prove unauthorized extraction of business information.
B:One missing system shows a gap requiring reconciliation, not proof that every tool is beyond repair.
C:Key rotation changes cryptographic lifecycle state and does not explain an undocumented website deployment.
Question 273
A company sends public web traffic through a managed WAF, but external recon discovers that its application origin server also accepts direct HTTP requests on a public IP address. What attack-surface weakness does this create?
- A legitimate private health check from the WAF to its backend
- An origin-bypass route around intended WAF inspection
- An HTTPS certificate trust error between the client and the WAF
- A WAF policy that permits one unwanted HTTP method
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Direct reachability lets adversaries address the backend without necessarily traversing the Layer 7 security policies at the public WAF.
Incorrect Answers
A:Controlled health checks from known gateway addresses are normal; arbitrary public access to the origin exposes a separate attack path.
C:Client trust problems affect TLS verification and do not explain how an attacker can reach the origin without using the protected entry point.
D:An overly permissive method rule weakens inspection for traffic that does pass through the WAF, whereas the finding identifies a different public path.
Question 274
A decommissioned cloud application leaves a DNS CNAME pointing to a third-party service name that no longer belongs to the organization. What attack should defenders assess?
- An abandoned CNAME that still targets a resource permanently reserved to the same tenant
- Intentional DNSSEC key rollover
- Mandatory ARP spoofing across the Internet
- Potential subdomain takeover through a dangling DNS record
- Guaranteed compromise of domain registrar credentials
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:If a provider lets another tenant claim the abandoned resource, attackers may serve content from the organization's trusted hostname.
Incorrect Answers
A:Stale records create risk, but takeover requires a claimable target; active verified ownership would change the exploitation condition.
B:Proper DNS key rotation concerns signed-zone trust and does not itself create an unclaimed external service target.
C:ARP poisoning depends on local link-layer paths and is not the mechanism for reclaiming a stale SaaS hostname binding.
E:A dangling CNAME can be abused without the attacker necessarily changing the organization's registrar account.
Question 275
A company wants early notice when new public TLS certificates are issued for its owned domains. Which data source can aid discovery?
- Only existing HTTPS listener logs from known servers
- Only internal DNS query caching statistics
- Local Windows pagefile statistics
- Certificate Transparency logs
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Public issuance records can reveal unexpected hostnames or certificate activity, subject to log coverage and validation of actual ownership.
Incorrect Answers
A:Application logs cover inventoried hosts but cannot independently reveal new certificate issuance for forgotten subdomains.
B:Internal resolver counts do not reliably expose newly issued public certificates for an organization's hostnames.
C:Memory paging records do not show Internet certificate issuance for organization-controlled hostnames.
Question 276
Employees deploy unreviewed SaaS tools using corporate credentials, creating unknown external data destinations. What inventory effort most directly reduces this exposure?
- Discover and govern SaaS application use and identity integrations
- Disable identity-provider audit logs
- Expand all on-premises server subnets without recording changes
- Block every software update regardless of origin
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:SaaS visibility links third-party applications to accounts, permissions, and data flows so access can be reviewed and revoked.
Incorrect Answers
B:Removing authentication and consent evidence conceals unmanaged SaaS activity instead of helping assess it.
C:More internal address capacity does not identify third-party tenants or risky OAuth permissions granted by staff.
D:Indiscriminate update blocking introduces new vulnerabilities and does not provide governance over external SaaS application use.
Question 277
A team inventories external assets using only IPs in a spreadsheet, but cloud addresses and ephemeral services change weekly. What is needed?
- A static inventory of on-premises hardware without cloud resource discovery
- A one-time static IP report printed annually
- A DNS resolver reset once per year
- Continuous discovery with ownership and cloud API reconciliation
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Automated scanning and provider inventory connections reduce gaps created by elastic addresses and frequently changing endpoints.
Incorrect Answers
A:Traditional equipment inventories cannot account for rapidly provisioned cloud endpoints and managed platform services.
B:A yearly snapshot cannot reliably represent dynamically created or retired cloud instances over the intervening months.
C:Cache invalidation affects lookup behavior and does not track cloud asset provisioning over time.
Question 278
A cloud project exposes a managed database to all Internet addresses despite an internal-only design requirement. What should attack surface analysis recommend?
- Expand the database's public CIDR allowance for convenience
- Disable cloud configuration audits until after launch
- Keep public exposure and merely obscure the database hostname
- Remove public network exposure and use controlled private connectivity
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Reducing the reachable path is more robust than relying solely on credentials when the service has no public access requirement.
Incorrect Answers
A:Broader ingress makes more clients able to reach the sensitive listener and increases the surface under assessment.
B:Missing audits hides whether the exposure persists and makes later drift harder to detect.
C:Names can be discovered, and public reachability remains a source of exploitation and password-guessing opportunities.
Question 279
An attack surface report lists an exposed admin interface, but no telemetry shows successful exploitation. What category best describes the exposed condition?
- Proven incident containment
- Verified exfiltration of secrets
- Indicator of exposure (IoE)
- Confirmed indicator of compromise (IoC)
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:An IoE points to a risky reachable configuration or weakness before any confirmed compromise, supporting preventive remediation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Discovery of exposure is not evidence that affected systems are isolated or the risky configuration has been corrected.
B:Unrestricted reachability cannot establish that information was transferred out of the environment.
D:IoCs represent signs associated with compromise; an exposed interface alone does not prove an attacker used it.
Question 280
A red team wants to assess an outside-facing application and claims verbal approval from an employee. What must defenders verify before permitting active tests?
- Written authorization defining targets, time windows, methods, and safeguards
- The tester's claimed job title alone
- That the organization has public DNS records
- A broad enterprise security-policy statement with no approved test scope
- A generic message saying the Internet is public
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Explicit scope protects operations and establishes legal authority and escalation paths for controlled security testing.
Incorrect Answers
B:A title does not establish permission to probe production assets or override agreed operational restrictions.
C:Public reachability is not consent for intrusive tests or proof of an authorized assessment.
D:General policy support for testing is not permission to run unspecified active probes against identified production targets.
E:Internet availability does not remove ownership or authorization requirements for security tests.