ECCouncil 312-50v13 (Certified Ethical Hacker v13) Practice Test 7

Question 60

Investigators compare two verified findings. First: Unlabeled removable drives placed near an office entrance prompt curious employees to insert them into corporate computers. Second: A trusted developer documentation site used by several employees is quietly altered to deliver malicious browser code to visitors who browse a particular technical article. Select TWO mechanisms directly represented here.

  1. Smishing
  2. Business email compromise
  3. OAuth consent phishing
  4. Watering-hole compromise
  5. USB baiting

Explanation

Correct Answers

D:

Watering-hole attacks compromise a site commonly visited by a target population, delivering malicious content through a trusted browsing habit; this technical behavior accounts for the watering-hole compromise observation, while USB baiting concerns the other independent evidence.

E:

Baiting offers an enticing physical or digital object to encourage unsafe action, such as connecting untrusted removable media; it is separately evidenced in the task, rather than being interchangeable with watering-hole compromise.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Smishing delivers phishing content through text messaging; the medium often creates pressure to follow a short link on a mobile device; the events given do not establish this behavior but do support USB baiting, watering-hole compromise.

B:

Business email compromise manipulates financial or business workflows through impersonation or compromised correspondence rather than necessarily delivering malware; the reported conditions are characteristic of USB baiting, watering-hole compromise, not that path.

C:

Consent phishing abuses delegated authorization: a seemingly valid login flow grants an untrusted application permissions without stealing the user's password; those prerequisites differ from the USB baiting, watering-hole compromise behavior in the record.

Question 61

An incident analyst is asked to classify this observed activity: A crafted Ethernet frame carries nested 802.1Q tags and reaches a VLAN different from the sender's access VLAN on a misconfigured trunk path. Which concept is the closest match?

  1. DHCP starvation
  2. SPAN mirror-port collection
  3. DHCP snooping bindings
  4. VLAN double-tagging attempt

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Double-tagging abuses VLAN tag handling and native VLAN behavior across trunks; exploitation depends on specific topology and tagging configuration. A practical defensive response is to avoid using user VLANs as trunk native VLANs and harden switch trunks; consistent tagging and explicit trunk configuration remove the cross-VLAN path rather than merely hiding VLAN identifiers.

Incorrect Answers

A:

DHCP starvation consumes address leases by presenting many apparent clients so legitimate machines cannot obtain a normal lease; the reported conditions are characteristic of VLAN double-tagging attempt, not that path.

B:

Switch port mirroring delivers copies of specified traffic to an analyzer without placing it inline in the production forwarding path; those prerequisites differ from the VLAN double-tagging attempt behavior in the record.

C:

DHCP snooping establishes trusted DHCP-server direction and binding data used by other access-layer protections such as dynamic ARP inspection; this would classify another type of evidence, whereas the actual finding shows VLAN double-tagging attempt.

Question 62

A security change request summarizes the problem as follows: A guest wireless network permits weak legacy TKIP sessions to keep a discontinued handheld scanner connected, despite support for AES-CCMP on modern endpoints. Which remediation is best suited to it?

  1. Use validated enterprise server certificates and rogue-AP detection
  2. Retire TKIP-only clients and require AES-CCMP or better
  3. Patch wireless clients and access points against key reinstallation flaws
  4. Use certificate-based network access instead of MAC lists as primary security

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Modern cipher suites remove legacy cryptographic exposure while avoiding insecure fallback choices driven by obsolete equipment. The safeguard responds to the underlying issue: TKIP was a transitional WPA mechanism and has weaknesses and compatibility limitations compared with modern CCMP-based encryption.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Clients that verify the authentication server identity are less likely to trust a lookalike AP offering the same SSID; the required correction concerns TKIP legacy cipher, so this is not the targeted control.

C:

Updated handshake handling prevents unsafe key reinstallation while preserving the normal protocol operation needed for secure association; the exposure here is TKIP legacy cipher, which calls for another protective mechanism.

D:

Cryptographic device identity resists simple address cloning and supports independent credential revocation for each managed endpoint; the action is aimed at MAC address filtering; it leaves the central TKIP legacy cipher condition unresolved.

Question 63

During a documented lab review, an analyst notes: A token verifier accepts an unexpected signature algorithm indicated by attacker-controlled header data instead of enforcing its configured policy. What mechanism should be recorded?

  1. Session fixation
  2. JWT audience validation
  3. TLS stripping
  4. JWT algorithm confusion

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

JWT algorithm confusion arises when signature verification trusts token-supplied algorithm choices that do not match the application's expected cryptographic method. The control that addresses this failure path is to pin accepted JWT algorithms and validate signatures with intended key types; an explicit algorithm allowlist prevents header manipulation from switching verification to an inappropriate or unsecured method.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Session fixation works when a preauthentication identifier is accepted as an authenticated session, allowing the person who already knows that identifier to reuse it; this would classify another type of evidence, whereas the actual finding shows JWT algorithm confusion.

B:

JWT audience claims identify the intended recipient; a valid signature alone does not authorize use of a token by every service trusting the issuer; the relevant mechanism in the observed workflow is JWT algorithm confusion instead.

C:

TLS stripping exploits an insecure initial navigation or downgrade path so subsequent requests use plaintext rather than the expected protected connection; those effects are not the JWT algorithm confusion pattern evidenced by the assessment.

Question 64

The tester submits the following verified finding: A newly deployed production host still exposes an installer welcome page and sample applications from the default server package. Which technique or condition is involved?

  1. Name-based virtual hosting
  2. Server version header
  3. Web-root permission weakness
  4. Default web content

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Default pages and demos can reveal installation state or unnecessary functionality that increases a web server's reachable attack surface. The appropriate hardening measure is to remove sample applications and harden the deployed server baseline, since eliminating unneeded components reduces exposed code paths instead of relying on the absence of links to hidden demo content.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Name-based virtual hosting routes requests using HTTP host identity, which may differ from the socket's IP address or default site; the relevant mechanism in the observed workflow is default web content instead.

B:

Response headers can reveal software identifiers that help attackers compare a host with known vulnerabilities; disclosure is not exploitation by itself; those effects are not the default web content pattern evidenced by the assessment.

C:

Overly broad filesystem write permissions let a compromised process alter deployed code or content beyond its legitimate runtime data needs; the case demonstrates default web content rather than the alternate mechanism.

Question 65

A controlled investigation yields this observation: A switch maintains IP, MAC, VLAN, and port associations learned from legitimate DHCP exchanges to evaluate later network claims. How should the team identify the underlying behavior?

  1. DHCP starvation
  2. DHCP snooping bindings
  3. Dynamic ARP inspection
  4. SPAN mirror-port collection

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

DHCP snooping establishes trusted DHCP-server direction and binding data used by other access-layer protections such as dynamic ARP inspection. A targeted mitigation is to protect trusted uplink configuration and refresh binding tables correctly; accurate bindings and port trust settings are prerequisites for effective spoofing protection and help avoid false drops during legitimate host moves.

Incorrect Answers

A:

DHCP starvation consumes address leases by presenting many apparent clients so legitimate machines cannot obtain a normal lease; those effects are not the DHCP snooping bindings pattern evidenced by the assessment.

C:

Dynamic ARP inspection validates ARP packets on untrusted switch ports, blocking forged mappings that could support local interception; the observed evidence concerns DHCP snooping bindings instead.

D:

Switch port mirroring delivers copies of specified traffic to an analyzer without placing it inline in the production forwarding path; the test record points specifically to DHCP snooping bindings, not this separate mechanism.

Question 66

Three separate observations were captured in an authorized exercise. First: A public search result contains the text of a confidential PDF that was briefly accessible on a website months earlier. Second: A domain's SPF TXT mechanism includes a recognizable outsourced bulk-mail platform, revealing one authorized sender infrastructure provider through an ordinary public DNS lookup. Third: A researcher uses a search engine's site and filetype filters to discover an indexed spreadsheet containing backup service account information that a site owner assumed nobody could find. Which THREE mechanisms account for these findings? Choose THREE.

  1. Search operators for exposure
  2. Email header analysis
  3. Public repository secret discovery
  4. Public document metadata
  5. Search engine indexing
  6. SPF DNS footprinting

Explanation

Correct Answers

A:

Search operators refine the results a search engine has already indexed; they do not bypass origin authentication to retrieve private content; this supports one of the required classifications, distinct from the evidence for search engine indexing, SPF DNS footprinting.

E:

Search-engine caches and indexes can retain discoverable content even after an origin page changes; removing a live link alone does not ensure deindexing; this supports one of the required classifications, distinct from the evidence for SPF DNS footprinting, search operators for exposure.

F:

SPF policies enumerate permitted sending sources in DNS and can disclose external mail providers or infrastructure relationships; this technical behavior accounts for the SPF DNS footprinting observation, while search engine indexing, search operators for exposure concerns the other independent evidence.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Email headers record mail transfer hops and authentication signals; display names alone are untrusted and do not prove the actual origin; the observed evidence concerns search engine indexing, SPF DNS footprinting, search operators for exposure instead.

C:

Git history and code-search indexing may retain credentials after deletion from the latest branch; a removed line is not proof that a token is secret again; the test record points specifically to search engine indexing, SPF DNS footprinting, search operators for exposure, not this separate mechanism.

D:

Document metadata can carry author names, revision details, software identifiers, and filesystem paths omitted from the visible body; that behavior is distinct from the search engine indexing, SPF DNS footprinting, search operators for exposure finding being classified.

Question 67

In a permitted test environment, the analyst records: A received message displays several Received headers and authentication results that clarify its routing history despite a forged-looking From name. What is the most precise classification?

  1. Email header analysis
  2. Search engine indexing
  3. SPF DNS footprinting
  4. Search operators for exposure

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Email headers record mail transfer hops and authentication signals; display names alone are untrusted and do not prove the actual origin. A practical defensive response is to enforce SPF, DKIM, and DMARC with aligned identities; these domain-authentication mechanisms help receivers assess spoofed mail and policy handling, though they do not eliminate all social-engineering risk.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Search-engine caches and indexes can retain discoverable content even after an origin page changes; removing a live link alone does not ensure deindexing; the test record points specifically to email header analysis, not this separate mechanism.

C:

SPF policies enumerate permitted sending sources in DNS and can disclose external mail providers or infrastructure relationships; that behavior is distinct from the email header analysis finding being classified.

D:

Search operators refine the results a search engine has already indexed; they do not bypass origin authentication to retrieve private content; the scenario identifies email header analysis, which has a different triggering condition.

Question 68

A production hardening ticket was raised after this confirmed observation: Several unknown thumb drives appear on conference room tables; the IT group wants to prevent curious staff from testing them on workstations. Which action best targets the risk?

  1. Authenticate high-risk requests using agreed challenge and callback procedures
  2. Restrict risky application consent and review delegated grants
  3. Use strong account-recovery proof and second-party review for factor resets
  4. Disable unapproved removable media and offer safe found-device reporting

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Device controls block execution or access from unknown media while a reporting route avoids relying only on curiosity-resistant behavior. The specific weakness being corrected is that baiting offers an enticing physical or digital object to encourage unsafe action, such as connecting untrusted removable media.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Process-based verification resists convincing synthesized audio without relying on human ability to recognize every manipulated recording; that safeguard does not directly close the USB baiting route highlighted by the test.

B:

Admin review and least-privilege OAuth permissions prevent a deceptive app from acquiring long-lived API access through user approval; the proposed improvement would make sense for OAuth consent phishing but not as the main fix here; the tested fault instead involves USB baiting.

C:

Recovery protections keep an impersonator from taking over the account simply by persuading support to replace or disable authentication controls; the specific root cause belongs to USB baiting, beyond this control's intended scope.

Question 69

During a documented lab review, an analyst notes: An application database stores passwords with a fast general-purpose hash, letting attackers test billions of candidates after a breach. What mechanism should be recorded?

  1. OCSP revocation lookup
  2. Hash collision concept
  3. Full-disk encryption boundary
  4. Argon2id password storage

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Password hashing should deliberately impose computational and memory cost; Argon2id is designed to slow offline guessing better than a fast digest alone. The control that addresses this failure path is to store salted passwords using tuned Argon2id parameters; unique salts defeat precomputed matches and memory-hard derivation increases the cost of large-scale cracking of leaked verifiers.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Online Certificate Status Protocol can report a certificate's revocation status through an issuer-designated responder; expiration dates alone do not reveal early revocation; that behavior is distinct from the argon2id password storage finding being classified.

B:

A cryptographic collision occurs when distinct inputs produce the same digest; fixed-size hashes necessarily have possible collisions, with practical resistance varying by algorithm; the scenario identifies argon2id password storage, which has a different triggering condition.

C:

Full-disk encryption protects data at rest against offline media access; it does not stop a logged-in or fully compromised running system from reading unlocked files; the defining symptom in the prompt is associated with argon2id password storage instead.

Question 70

During a documented lab review, an analyst notes: A switch drops an ARP reply because its asserted address-to-MAC association conflicts with the trusted binding database. What mechanism should be recorded?

  1. Dynamic ARP inspection
  2. NetBIOS name-service spoofing
  3. DHCP snooping bindings
  4. DNS response spoofing

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Dynamic ARP inspection validates ARP packets on untrusted switch ports, blocking forged mappings that could support local interception. This is why teams should configure DAI alongside correct DHCP snooping or static bindings; binding-based validation prevents spoofed neighbor mappings, but static-IP devices require suitable entries to avoid disrupting legitimate traffic.

Incorrect Answers

B:

NetBIOS name-service broadcasts can be answered by untrusted local peers when stronger authenticated name resolution is unavailable; the defining symptom in the prompt is associated with dynamic ARP inspection instead.

C:

DHCP snooping establishes trusted DHCP-server direction and binding data used by other access-layer protections such as dynamic ARP inspection; the events given do not establish this behavior but do support dynamic ARP inspection.

D:

DNS response spoofing impersonates a reply to an outstanding lookup; success depends on response matching and resolver defenses against forgeries; the reported conditions are characteristic of dynamic ARP inspection, not that path.

Certified Ethical Hacker v13 (312-50v13) Practice Tests